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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction of this case under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether there was legally sufficient evidence in 
the record to show that plaintiff had failed in its duty as 
landlord to supply heating and air conditioning to defendant' s 
store. Plaintiff was given summary judgment on this issue. 
That being the case, the Court must view the facts in a light 
most favorable to defendant, to determine whether those facts 
justify entry of judgment for plaintiff as a matter of law, 
giving no deference to the trial court' s conclusions of law, 
which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. 
State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether the parol evidence rule in Utah bars 
claims for fraudulent inducement. This was a conclusion of law 
by the trial that is to be reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd. , 786 P. 2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). 
3. Whether the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing can be read to prohibit a landlord from opening a 
competing business in the leased premises. Same standard of 
review as 2 above. 
4. Whether plaintiff as landlord had a duty to act 
reasonably so as to protect the business of its tenants from 
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interference and disturbance during remodeling. Same standard 
of review as 2 above. 
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding plaintiff attorneys' fees for time spent certifying and 
appealing from the first Order and Judgment. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 
P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980). 
6. Whether the record supports a finding by the trial 
court of a knowing, voluntary and intentional waiver by defen-
dant of her right to trial by jury. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 
458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action represents a dispute between landlord and 
tenant. TS1 Partnership (" TS1" ) is the landlord. (R. 3, 1f 4) 
It is the owner of Trolley Square in Salt Lake City. (R. 3, U 3) 
TS1 rented space in Trolley Square to Penny Allred ("Allred") 
who operated a shop in the mall known as "It's About Time." (R. 
3, 11 4) Allred was in the business of selling clocks, watches 
and time-pieces at retail. (R. 12, 1f n) 
TS1 filed the action in the court below seeking rent 
for the period of time that Allred held over as tenant. (R. 3, 
1111 8-9) Allred agreed that she owed rent as a hold-over tenant. 
(R. 236, 11 3) However, included in the rent was a charge for 
heating and air conditioning, TS1' s " HVAC Plant Charge." (R. 12, 
11 1; R. 32, § 7. 4) Allred categorically denied receiving the 
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heating and air conditioning services for which the HVAC Plant 
Charge was made. (R. 237, UU 4-7) 
TSl moved for summary judgment on its complaint. (R. 
157) Allred admitted owing $6,665.98 in back rent and consented 
to entry of judgment for that amount. (R. 2 3 6, 11 3) However, 
Allred challenged the remaining $6,634. 34 sought by TSl because 
$6,054. 29 represented HVAC Plant Charges made by TSl over the 
life of the lease and the remaining $580.05 represented various 
duplicate and unspecified charges (which have since been dropped 
by TSl). (R. 237, UU 4-9) 
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, 
Allred filed an Affidavit addressing each of the disputed 
charges. (R. 23 6) In paragraph 7, she stated that the "bay" 
where her store was located had never been connected to TS1; s 
central heating and air conditioning system. (R. 237) Thus, 
even though she had installed (at her own expense) the local 
delivery system required by the lease agreement (R. 71, U 3), 
she did not get heating and air conditioning because it never 
reached her bay. 
TSl did not controvert any of these material facts. 
(RR. 242-43) It simply asked the Court to conclude, as a matter 
of law, that since Allred had the duty to install an HVAC 
delivery system in her store, TSl was relieved of any obligation 
concerning heating and air conditioning. (R. 243, "Since it was 
161X10157. 
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the Defendant's contractual duty to provide her own HVAC 
distribution system, no defect in said system is chargeable to 
Plaintiff. " ) 
On the basis of this argument, the trial court granted 
summary judgment for all of the disputed HVAC charges. (R. 2 70) 
An Order and Judgment was entered on November 2, 1990 for 
$12,720.27, together with attorneys' fees of $1,560.00. (R. 271) 
Copies of the Minute Entry and Order and Judgment are reproduced 
at Addendum A hereto. 
This left Allred with her Counterclaim. (R. 70) In 
her First Claim for Relief, she alleged that she had been 
induced to enter into the lease agreement on the basis of 
fraudulent representations, such as: TS1 was going to spend 
$800, 000 advertising the grand re-opening of Trolley Square and 
that as part of the remodeling efforts, parking would be 
increased. (RR. 70-71) As Second and Third Claims for Relief, 
Allred alleged that TS1 opened a competing business at Trolley 
Square in violation of an implied covenant in the lease 
agreement (R. 72) and that TS1 failed to conduct the remodeling 
efforts in her bay in a reasonable manner, causing interference 
and disturbance to her business. (R. 73) 
TS1 moved for summary judgment on all of Allred' s 
counterclaims. (R. 358) TS1 argued that Allred's fraudulent 
["'inducement claim was barred by the parol evidence rule. (RR. 
-4-
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368-71) On the competition claim, TS1 contended there was 
nothing in the lease agreement to prevent it from opening a 
business that competed with Allred7s at Trolley Square. (R. 372) 
As for the business interference claim, TS1 argued it had no 
duty under the lease agreement to protect Allred7 s business 
during remodeling. (RR. 3 72-74) 
TS1 did not attempt to controvert any of the factual 
allegations in Allred7 s Counterclaim. (RR. 360-64)1 Rather, 
its second summary judgment motion, just like the first, was 
grounded entirely on conclusions of law. (R. 365, "Intro-
duction" ) 
Once again, the trial court granted TS17 s motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 520) This was done without a hearing, 
though Allred requested one pursuant to the Code of Judicial 
Administration. (R. 4 94) An Order and Judgment was entered on 
October 27, 1992, dismissing Allred7 s Counterclaim with 
prejudice. (R. 614) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were also signed at TS17s request (R. 607), though Allred 
The only factual statement made by TS1 in the summary 
judgment motion was that Allred signed the lease agreement (R. 
360, 11 1), a fact that Allred has never denied. (R. 69, 11 4) All 
of the remaining statements were merely restatements and 
characterizations of provisions in the lease agreement or 
allegations in Allred7 s Counterclaim. 
-5-
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objected to their form. (R. 524 ) 2 Copies of the Minute Entry, 
Order and Judgment, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
are reproduced at Addendum B hereto. 
As part of this second Order and Judgment, the trial 
court awarded TSl attorneys' fees of $8,760.00. (R. 615, 11 5) 
This was in addition to the $1,560. 00 previously awarded TSl as 
attorneys' fees in the first Order and Judgment. (R. 272, 11 3) 
Allred objected to the amount of the request (R. 528) because 
most of the fees ($4,740. 00) were for pursuing certification of 
the first Order and Judgment and then appeal from that Order. 
(RR. 593-601, charges for November 23, 1990 to February 12, 
1992)3 
Certification was done at TSl's instance (R. 296), so 
that it could execute on the first Order and Judgment. (R. 276) 
This left Allred no choice but to appeal (R. 315) in order to 
preserve her objection to the errors made by the trial court. 
Allred had previously warned the trial court that certification 
2None of the conclusions necessarily made by the trial court 
are reflected in the Conclusions of Law, while most of the 
"findings" in the Findings of Fact were truly conclusions of law. 
3Allred also objected (RR. 529-30) to an award of $580.00 for 
time spent by TSl trying to execute on the supersedeas bond posted 
by Allred (RR. 601-02, charges for February 20 to April 14, 1992) 
and still another charge of $330.00 for time spent arranging a 
scheduling conference with the trial court. (RR. 602-03, charges 
for April 20-22, May 11, 13, 22, June 1 and 2, 1992) Allred 
agreed to a charge of $3,110.00 (R. 530), which seemed more in 
line with the $1, 560. 00 previously awarded on the grant of the 
first summary judgment motion. (R. 270) 
-6-
161X10157. 
was improper because of the pendency of her counterclaim. (RR. 
298-300) Copies of both purported certifications are reproduced 
at Addendum C hereto. (See n. 5, infra) 
Just as she predicted, the Court of Appeals (Case No. 
910189-CA) questioned the jurisdiction of the appeal (in a 
Notice of Sua Sponte Consideration for Summary Disposition, 
December 18, 1991). Unfortunately, this was after briefs had 
been filed. In a Memorandum Decision dated February 7, 1992 (R. 
328), the Court of Appeals ruled per curiam that given the 
pendency of the counterclaim there was no final judgment from 
which to appeal. (R. 329) It therefore dismissed the appeal for 
lack of appellate jurisdiction, and remitted the case to the 
trial court. (R. 331) 
There is one final issue the Court must consider, and 
it involves the first ruling made by the trial court in this 
case. Allred timely demanded trial by jury of all issues in 
this action. (R. 73) TS1 moved to strike the jury trial demand 
(R. 139) because there was a jury trial waiver buried on the 
forty-eighth page of the small print of the lease agreement. (R. 
133) The motion to strike was opposed with an affidavit by 
Allred (R. 145) stating that she was not informed of the 
existence of the jury trial waiver (H 6); the lease agreement 
was presented to her on a "take it or leave it" basis (H 5); and 
161X10157. 
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she was an unsophisticated business person who had never before 
signed anything as complex as the lease agreement (HU 2-4). 
TS1 rested on the jury trial waiver in the lease 
agreement. (RR. 148-49) In an Order dated August 30, 1990, the 
trial court granted the motion to strike. (R. 155) Copies of 
the Minute Entry and Order are reproduced at Addendum D hereto. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary 
judgment in TS1' s favor on the $6,054.29 HVAC Plant Charge. 
There was legally sufficient evidence in the record to show that 
TS1 had failed to supply heating and air conditioning to 
Allred' s bay. It is beyond question that TS1 had the legal duty 
to supply heating and air conditioning to Allred' s bay. Summary 
judgment on the HVAC Plant Charge should have been denied. 
2. The trial court erred when it ruled that the parol 
evidence rule in Utah bars claims for fraudulent inducement. It 
also erred when it ruled that the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing does not require a landlord to refrain from 
opening a competing business in the leased premises. The trial 
court erred when it ruled as a matter of law that TS1 had no 
duty to protect Allred' s business during remodeling. 
3. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding 
attorneys7 fees for time spent pursuing the fruitless certifi-
cation and appeal instigated by TS1. 
161X10157 
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4. The record does not support a finding by the trial 
court that Allred made a knowing, voluntary or intentional 
waiver of her right to trial by jury. The trial court struck 
Allred' s jury demand in the face of uncontroverted evidence that 
Allred did not know about the waiver and the waiver itself was 
buried inconspicuously on the forty-eighth page of the lease 
agreement. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. AN ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER 
TSl SUPPLIED HEATING AND AIR CONDI-
TIONING TO ALLRED. 
In a good faith effort to streamline these procee-
dings, Allred conceded an obligation to pay rent for the period 
of time that she held over as tenant. However, she plainly 
disputed any liability to TSl for HVAC Plant Charges, based on 
the failure by TSl to supply any heating or air conditioning to 
the "bay" in which her store was located. 
For its part, TSl chose not to challenge these 
assertions. Rather, it argued that it had no legal obligation 
to supply heating and air conditioning to Allred. To be sure, 
there is some ambiguity in the language of the lease agreement 
as to the extent and precise nature of each party7 s obligation, 
but TSl is wrong when it says it had no obligation to supply 
heating and air conditioning. Unfortunately, TSl succeeded in 
161X10157 
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getting the trial court to read an affirmative obligation to 
supply heating and air conditioning out of the lease agreement. 
The relevant portions of the lease agreement regarding 
heating and air conditioning are found in point (1) of the 
Summary of Fundamental Lease Provisions (R. 171), wherein Allred 
is obligated to pay $3. 22 per square foot for HVAC Equipment, 
and at point 5 of Schedule "B, " titled "HVAC." (R. 250) This 
latter section provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Central System - Landlord will provide and 
maintain a central plant and a system of 
chilled air to the premises installed at a 
point determined by the Landlord. Tenant 
agrees to adapt to Landlord' s central system 
and provide a complete air distribution 
system connected to the air volume control 
unit. The air volume control unit and 
thermostat will be furnished and installed 
by the Landlord, at Tenant7 s expense and 
sized to accommodate the design conditions 
as defined below. . . . 
(1) Central System Design - The landlord's 
central plant and system of chilled air 
supply will be designed to provide the 
following capacities per square foot of 
floor area of the Tenant' s leased premises: 
a. Design Total Cooling 30 BTU/Hr.SF 
b. Design Air Delivery 0. 70 CFM/SF 
c. Available Air Pressure 
(Downstream of Air 
Volume Control Unit) 0. 25 inches of water 
d. Air Supply Temperature 
summer 54F DB & 53. 4 FWB 
winter 57 F DB 
(2) Operation - Landlord will make chilled 
air available to the premises at such times 
and days as the Center is normally open for 
business to the public. 
161X10157. 
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Under Schedule "B, " Allred has an obligation to 
install certain equipment to connect to TSl' s HVAC system. 
However, it is equally clear that TSl has an obligation to 
provide a system from which the tenant can draw cooled and 
heated air. The Schedule even describes the air volume and 
temperatures for air piped through the system. It therefore 
cannot be disputed that TSl had some obligation under the lease 
agreement to provide heated and chilled air. 
It may be (as TSl suggests, R. 243) that Allred failed 
to properly hook into the central distribution system. However, 
it is just as possible (as Allred contends, R. 237, 11 7) that 
TSl failed to pump heated and chilled air to Allred' s bay. 
Either way, it is difficult to conceive of a more straight-
forward question of fact. The trial court erred in concluding 
that TSl had no duty to supply heating and air conditioning, and 
paragraph 7 of Allred' s Affidavit was sufficient to send the 
issue of whether TSl had breached that duty to the trier of 
fact. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN DISMISSING ALLRED' S 
COUNTERCLAIM. 
A. First Claim for Relief 
TSl' s motion for summary judgment on the First Claim 
for Relief in Allred' s Counterclaim was based entirely on the 
terms of the lease agreement. It was also based on the 
-11-
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erroneous proposition that the parol evidence rule in Utah does 
not recognize an exception for claims of fraud in the 
inducement. 
What is strange, TS1 cited a case that contradicted 
the very position it took in the court below. Rainford v. 
Rvtting. 451 P. 2d 769, 770-71 (Utah 1969). Allred could have 
stopped there, but offered what she considered to be even 
stronger Utah authority on the subject. 
Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P. 2d 663 (Utah 1985) has 
the following statement: 
The parol evidence rule. . . has a very narrow 
application. Simply stated, the rule 
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, 
or representations offered for the purpose 
of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract. . . . Parol evidence is 
admissible to prove that a party was induced 
into a contract by fraud, despite a deter-
mination that a writing is an integrated 
contract. " 
707 P.2d at 665-66 (emphasis added). 
TS1 relied on an opinion from the Arizona Court of 
Appeals to the effect that parol evidence is inadmissible to 
support a claim of fraudulent inducement that contradicts or 
varies the express terms of a written contract. Spudnuts v. 
Lane, 641 P. 2d 915 (Ariz. App. 1982). That is not the law in 
Utah. 
161X10157 
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Consider Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 
P. 2d 798 (Utah 1980). This was an action on a series of 
promissory notes. The signers of the notes defended on the 
basis of a claim of fraudulent inducement. Plaintiff contended 
that a fraudulent inducement defense could not be set up because 
"defendants had no right to rely on any representations made 
which were inconsistent with the terms of the notes. " 607 P. 2d 
at 800. 
The case was tried to a jury. The jury returned a 
special verdict finding that defendants had been fraudulently 
induced to enter into the promissory notes. The trial court 
denied motions for directed verdict. The Supreme Court upheld 
both the jury verdict and the trial court's denial of the 
motions for directed verdict, necessarily concluding that 
defendants' fraudulent inducement claims were not barred as a 
matter of law. 
Of course, this contention by TS1 begs an essential 
question, that is, whether Allred made any claim that contra-
dicts or varies the express provisions of the lease agreement. 
TS1 never even tried to demonstrate that this was the case. 
The representations alleged by Allred appear in 
paragraph 1 of the First Claim for Relief. (R. 70) Allred 
specifically alleged that prior to signing the lease agreement, 
four people representing Trolley Square (identified by name) 
161X10157 
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made the following representations for the purpose of inducing 
her execution of the lease agreement: 
(a) That TS1 intended to make Trolley 
Square the "showplace" of Salt 
Lake City; 
(b) That TS1 intended to expend 
approximately $800,000 to 
advertise the "grand re-opening" 
of Trolley Square after 
remodeling; 
(c) That Trolley Square attracted 
70,000 visitors weekly and was 
Utah7 s second favorite tourist 
attraction; 
(d) That parking at Trolley Square 
would be increased; and 
(e) That the "grand re-opening" of 
Trolley Square would take place by 
a date certain, prior to August, 
1988. 
Allred went on to allege that she was told by those 
same Trolley Square representatives that in order to take 
advantage of the benefits of the newly remodeled Trolley Square, 
and as a precondition to the execution of the lease agreement, 
she would have to remodel her tenant' s space at her expense. (R. 
71, H 2) 
It is clear that none of the claimed fraudulent 
representations violates an express provision of the lease 
agreement. The first is not covered by any provision in the 
lease agreement. The second is covered by Section 9. 1. (R. 37) 
161X10157 
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However, there is nothing in that Section specifying the amount 
of advertising dollars to be spent by TSl. The third is not 
covered by any provision in the lease agreement. The fourth is 
covered by Section 1.4 (R. 15), but that Section says only that 
TSl may increase parking, not that it will or that it will not. 
The fifth is covered by Section 2.5(a) (R. 18), and it is 
perfectly consistent with that Section. Section 2.5(a) says 
only that the "Grand Opening Date" is to be "established by 
Landlord," which is the very thing Allred claims TSl did. As 
for the sixth, it is also perfectly consistent with Schedule "B" 
to the lease agreement, governing improvements by landlord and 
tenant. (R. 459) 
Thus, even under the restrictive interpretation of the 
parol evidence rule urged upon the Court by TSl, the First Claim 
for Relief in Allred' s Counterclaim should have stood. 
B. Second Claim for Relief 
Under the lease agreement, Allred was prohibited from 
making any use of the premises, other than that set forth in the 
Summary of Fundamental Lease Provisions. (R. 12, 11 (n) ) The 
lease agreement also penalized Allred if she were to operate a 
similar or competing business within five miles of Trolley 
Square. (R. 28, U (d) ) 
All that Allred asked is that TSl not open a business 
that competed with hers in Trolley Square. That is precisely 
161X10157 
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what Allred claims TSl did. In her Second Claim for Relief, 
Allred alleged that starting in September, 1989, TSl opened a 
business called "San Francisco Music Box" as a tenant in Trolley 
Square. (R. 72, H 7) This new business competed directly with 
two of the permitted use of Allred7 s leased premises: retail 
sales of "music boxes, musical figurines." (R. 12, H (n)) What 
is worse, TSl opened San Francisco Music Box free of rent in an 
attempt to induce a long-term lease agreement. (R. 71, 1[ 7) 
Allred estimated that she lost $15,000 in sales during the 
period of time that San Francisco Music Box was in the mall. (R. 
72, 1f 8) 
TSl argued there was nothing in the lease agreement 
preventing it from opening a business that competed with one of 
its existing tenants. (R. 372, 11 B) TST s argument misses the 
point. Allred contends that under the circumstances, it is fair 
to imply a duty on the part of TSl that corresponds with the 
duty of Allred, not to open a competing business within the 
marketing zone of Allred7 s business at Trolley Square. Thus, 
Allred7 s argument is premised on the implied duty of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
Allred agrees that the implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing cannot be used to "establish new, independent 
rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties." Heslop v. Bank 
of Utah, 839 P. 2d 828, 840 (Utah 1992). Rather, it is "read 
161X10157 
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into contracts in order to protect the express covenants or 
promises of the contract. ..." Peterson v. Browning, 832 P. 2d 
1280, 1284 (Utah 1992). The duty equates with a promise by each 
party that it "will not intentionally or purposely do anything 
that will destroy or injure the other party' s right to receive 
the fruits of the contract. " St. Benedict' s Development Company 
v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P. 2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991). The 
duty says that "a party's actions must be consistent with the 
agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the 
other party." 811 P. 2d at 200. 
This cannot be done by examination of the express 
contract terms alone. St. Benedict' s Development Company v. St. 
Benedict' s Hospital, 811 P. 2d at 200. "The purpose, intentions, 
and expectations of the parties should be determined by 
considering the contract language and the course of dealings 
between and conduct of the parties." rd. (emphasis in original). 
Allred expressly covenanted to sell only certain items 
at Trolley Square and also to pay heavily for the right to open 
a competing business within five miles of Trolley Square. These 
provisions were clearly intended to protect TS1' s existing 
tenants at Trolley Square and also to protect TS1's "percentage 
rent" (six percent of Allred' s gross sales in excess of $425,000 
per rental year). (R. 12, H (i)) Query whether these same 
contractual provisions do not reflect an agreed common purpose 
161X10157. 
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in the lease agreement that Allred maximize sales to the mutual 
advantage of both parties without interfering with the business 
of TS1' s other tenants at Trolley Square. Since she was being 
asked to sell only certain items, was it unreasonable for her to 
expect that similar restrictions would be placed on other 
tenants? Since she was being asked to maximize sales in Trolley 
Square, was it unreasonable for her to expect that TS1 would 
refrain from assisting a competing tenant by providing rental 
space in Trolley Square free of charge? 
We ask the Court to consider in greater detail the 
case of St. Benedict7 s Development Company v. St. Benedict7 s 
Hospital. supra. The Hospital leased ground that it owned to 
the Development Company for the purpose of constructing a 
professional office building. The lease agreement placed 
restrictions on the kinds of tenants who could sublease space 
from the Development Company. 4 Later, the parties agreed to 
construct a second professional office building. In this 
agreement, the Hospital promised to help the Development Company 
obtain tenants for the new office space. Years later, the 
Hospital announced it was going to construct a third profes-
sional office building, this time with another developer. The 
Office space was unqualifiedly restricted to medical 
r practitioners. Then, so far as practicable, office space was 
reserved for medical practitioners with privileges at the 
Hospital. 
-18-
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Development Company sued, claiming among other things that the 
Hospital had violated the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
There was nothing in the agreements between the 
parties prohibiting the Hospital from going to a different 
developer to build new professional office space near the 
Hospital. 811 P.2d at 198. However, the Court accepted for 
purposes of the appeal, the Development Company' s allegation 
that 
the operation of the [hospital and the 
professional building] would be conducted 
for the mutual economic advantage and 
benefit of the parties, and that neither 
party would conduct itself in such a way as 
to cause diminution of patients of the 
hospital or tenants of the professional 
building, or economic loss to the other. 
Id. at 196. 
Based on this, the Court determined that "the 
hospital's encouragement of a competing office building suggests 
that there may have been a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 200 (citation omitted). 
The trial court' s dismissal of the claim was reversed, id. 
This case is at the same stage of development. 
Allred' s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing was dismissed as a matter of law, the trial 
court concluding that there was no implied covenant preventing 
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TS1 from opening a competing tenant. For its part, TS1 did not 
challenge the sufficiency of the factual allegations in the 
Counterclaim. Rather, it rested on the express terms of the 
lease agreement, arguing that there was no provision in the 
lease agreement prohibiting it from leasing space to a 
competitor of one of its existing tenants at Trolley Square. 
The trial court necessarily concluded (in the face of Allred' s 
arguments to the contrary, RR. 491-92) that Allred had failed to 
state a claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing, or that such a duty did not inhere in lease agree-
ments. Either way, the trial court erred. 
C. Third Claim for Relief 
Allred' s Third Claim for Relief was for breach of the 
express terms of the lease agreement. Section 1. 4 of the lease 
agreement provides that the "Landlord shall use its reasonable 
efforts to assure that [building operations] will cause as 
little inconvenience, annoyance and disturbance to Tenant as 
possible consistent with accepted construction practice in the 
vicinity and to assure that such work shall be expeditiously 
completed." (R. 16) In paragraph 9 of her Counterclaim, Allred 
alleged that the "vast remodeling of Trolley Square" undertaken 
by TS1 in 1986 and 1987, subjected Allred to "noise, blocked 
hallways, and broken and dirtied inventory. ..." 
161X10157 
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Inexplicably, the trial court dismissed this Third 
Claim for Relief, despite the existence of express contractual 
language supplying the duty that Allred claimed was breached, 
all of which was brought to the trial court7 s attention. (R. 
493-94) TSl did not refute the allegations of Allred's 
Counterclaim. It simply alleged that there was no obligation in 
the lease agreement to protect Allred from its remodeling 
efforts. (R. 515) Once again, the trial court was in error. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS' 
FEES FOR THE CERTIFICATION AND 
APPEAL INSTIGATED BY TSl. 
First thing after entry of the November 2, 1990 Order 
and Judgment, TSl started collection efforts. (R. 276) This was 
despite the fact that the Order and Judgment was not final and 
had not been certified pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (Addendum A hereto) Allred moved to stay 
execution. (R. 283) TSl's response was to seek Rule 54(b) 
certification. (R. 296) Allred argued that the pendency of her 
Counterclaim made certification ineffective. (RR. 298-300) The 
trial court disregarded this warning and proceeded to certify 
the first Order and Judgment as final and appealable. (Addendum 
161X10157 
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C hereto)5 Just as expected, the Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. (R. 329) 
This is now an issue because the trial court awarded 
$4, 740. 00 in attorneys' fees for time spent by TS1 pursuing 
certification of the first Order and Judgment and the appeal 
therefrom. (RR. 593-601, charges for November 23, 1990 to 
February 12, 1992) Allred objected to the request because the 
certification and appeal turned out to be a complete waste of 
time, all of which was occasioned by TS1 and its headlong rush 
to execution. (RR. 528-29) The fault lies with TS1, not Allred. 
No matter the outcome of this appeal, TS1 should pay its own 
attorneys' fees for the previous appeal. 
Allred also objects to two other attorneys' fees 
awards. TS1 received $580. 00 for time spent pursuing execution 
of the supersedeas bond posted by Allred. TS1 was supposed to 
make a motion (with notice to Allred) to get the bond released. 
(R. 322) TS1 ignored this requirement and tried to garnish the 
bond. (R. 326) When the trial court resisted, TS1 abandoned its 
efforts. The trial court ultimately entered an "Order 
Continuing Stay of Execution Upon Appeal" (R. 627) continuing 
Actually, the first certification did not stick. The trial 
court neglected to make the "express determination" required by 
Rule 54(b). (Addendum C hereto, R. 311) Not surprisingly, the 
Court of Appeals issued a Notice of Sua Sponte Consideration for 
Summary Disposition (April 12, 1991). TS1 tried to fix the 
certification in an Amended Order of April 22, 1991. (Addendum C 
hereto, R. 320) 
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the stay without an increase in the bond. Allred should not 
have to pay for TS1' s wrongful and completely unsuccessful 
attempts at garnishing the supersedeas bond. 
Finally, Allred objects to an award of $330.00 for 
time spent arranging a scheduling conference with the trial 
court. Allred did not object to the $50.00 charged for 
attendance at the conference. Allred fails to see how it could 
have possibly required three and a half hours of lawyer time to 
arrange a scheduling conference. The charge is clearly 
excessive and unreasonable. 
Should she lose this appeal, Allred has agreed to an 
attorneys' fees charge of $3,110.00 for the second summary 
judgment, which seems more in line with the $1,560.00 previously 
awarded on the first summary judgment. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING 
ALLRED' S JURY TRIAL DEMAND. 
The trial court7 s ruling is not supported by findings. 
Therefore, the basis for the ruling is not clear. There are two 
alternative bases on which the court could have ruled; either it 
concluded that Allred is deemed to have read and understood the 
waiver provision of the lease agreement, or it ruled that she 
failed to allege sufficient facts to raise a material issue as 
to whether she was actually aware of the waiver. In either 
case, the trial court' s ruling was in error. 
161X10157 
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The right to trial by jury in a civil case is 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Article I, § 10. While 
Utah case law is scant, federal cases dealing with the issue 
have repeatedly held that for a waiver to be effective, it must 
be "knowing" and "intentional." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938). In determining whether waiver 
has been knowingly and intentionally made, the Court must 
"indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver." Aetna 
Insurance Company v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S. Ct. 809, 
812 (1937). 
Applying this standard to the context of contractual 
waiver prior to litigation, it is possible to waive the right to 
trial by jury in advance, but the party seeking enforcement of 
the waiver carries the burden of proving it was both voluntary 
and informed. Leasing Service Corporation v. Crane, 804 F. 2d 
828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986). Issues relevant to a determination 
whether a contractual waiver was intentional and informed 
include the relative bargaining positions of the parties; 
whether or not a given clause in the contract was actually 
bargained for; and whether or not the provision is conspicuous 
in the contract. K. M. C. Company, Inc. v. Irving Trust Company, 
757 F. 2d 752, 757 (6th Cir. 1985)(and cases cited therein). 
In the court below, TS1 argued that the waiver was 
part of a contract, which Allred was deemed to have read and 
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understood when she signed it. Whatever the merits of this 
argument in the context of purely private contractual rights, 
the issue of jury trial waiver is one of Constitutional 
proportion and implicates social policies far beyond private 
commercial concerns. Therefore, general rules governing imputed 
knowledge of the contents of a contract are inapplicable and 
waiver should be found only where the waiving party has inten-
tionally agreed to the waiver on the basis of actual, not 
imputed knowledge of the existence of the waiver. 
Dreilina v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc. , 53 9 F. 
Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 1982) articulates this standard in a factual 
context similar to that before the Court. In Dreilina, the 
defendants sought to strike a demand for jury trial based on a 
waiver provision in a standard Peugeot Dealer contract. The 
contract ran some twenty-two pages and the jury waiver was 
imbedded at page twenty. In denying the motion, the court held 
as follows: 
In view of this strong presumption the 
defendants have a very heavy burden of 
proving that the plaintiffs knowingly, 
voluntarily and intentionally agreed upon 
the jury waiver provision in the 1978 
Agreement. A constitutional right so 
fundamental as the right to jury trial 
cannot be waived unknowingly by mere 
insertion of a waiver provision on the 
twentieth page of a twenty-two page 
standardized form contract. 
Dreilina, 539 F. Supp. at 403. 
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The court went on to indicate that there was no 
evidence that the waiver provision was bargained for; no 
evidence that it was mentioned during negotiations; and 
significant evidence that the bargaining power of the parties 
was so unequal as to permit little if any room for negotiation. 
Allred raised the following unrefuted factual 
allegations supported by Affidavit in opposition to TS1' s Motion 
to Strike: That she was a novice in the business world; that 
she had never before entered into a lease agreement; that she 
was not aware of the waiver of right to jury trial in the lease; 
that she was told that other tenants of Trolley Square were 
agreeing to the lease without changes; and that she would have 
to sign the lease if she wished to retain her store. 
An even cursory glance through the lease agreement 
discloses the adhesive and overreaching nature of the document. 
The table of contents alone covers over two pages of fine print. 
The only points on which it can reasonably be stated that the 
parties reached agreement appear in the "Summary of Fundamental 
Lease Provisions," which comprises two pages, followed by forty-
six pages of one-sided, pro-landlord legal jargon and an 
additional twenty pages of terms and conditions contained in the 
schedules, all for the lease of some eight hundred square feet. 
The jury waiver provision is buried on page forty-eight of the 
lease agreement at sub-point eighteen of Section 19. To suggest 
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that this barrage of legal verbiage is a true reflection of an 
actual agreement between two parties stretches even the flexible 
fabric of legal fiction. To further suggest that the jury 
waiver was made knowingly and intentionally because it appeared 
in this form agreement is absurd. 
As noted above, in order for this Court to rule in 
favor of TS1 on its Motion to Strike, it must find that Allred 
knowingly and intentionally waived her right to trial by jury. 
While the trial court' s decision is not supported by findings, 
the only possible basis for the decision is that the waiver 
appeared in the contract and the contract was signed by Allred. 
However, the burden of proof on this issue lies with TS1 to 
demonstrate that Allred knowingly and intentionally waived her 
rights. There is no such finding and indeed, on the record 
before this Court, there is insufficient evidence to support a 
finding of knowing and intentional waiver. Therefore the trial 
court either applied an incorrect legal standard or it failed to 
permit the development of a factual record sufficient to support 
its ruling. In either case, the ruling is incorrect and should 
be reversed with an instruction to reinstate Allred7 s demand for 
trial by jury on all claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Allred is entitled to a trial by jury on the issue 
whether TS1 breached its agreement to supply heating and air 
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conditioning to Allred' s bay at Trolley Square. Allred 
successfully controverted TSl's summary judgment motion with an 
affidavit setting forth a legally sufficient basis for the 
conclusion that TS1 failed to connect Allred7 s bay to its 
central delivery system, so that even if she correctly connected 
to the central delivery system, she would not have received 
chilled or heated air. The trial court' s ruling was more likely 
based on the erroneous legal proposition, forwarded by TS1, that 
it had no obligation to deliver heated or chilled air to 
Allred' s store. Either way, the grant of summary judgment on 
TS1' s HVAC Plant Charge was in error and should be reversed. 
Allred is entitled to trial by jury on the issues 
raised by her Counterclaim. Utah law on the parol evidence rule 
does not bar a claim for fraud in the inducement. In any event, 
none of Allred' s claimed misrepresentations contradict or vary 
an express term of the lease agreement. Allred has demonstrated 
that Utah law on the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing recognizes a duty on the part of a landlord not to open 
a business that competes and interferes with one of its existing 
tenants. Finally, Allred properly alleged breach of an express 
provision of the lease agreement, when she alleged that TS1' s 
remodeling had damaged her business. The trial court was wrong 
in granting TS1' s second summary judgment motion and should be 
reversed. 
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Should Allred prevail on either of these two claims, 
she should be awarded her attorneys' fees on appeal. The right 
to attorneys' fees reserved by TSl to it alone (R. 51, 11 (c)) is 
now reciprocal because the lease agreement was executed after 
April 28, 1986. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 5. 
Even if Allred fails on this appeal, the award of 
attorneys' fees against her on the second summary judgment 
motion should be reduced to $3,110.00. Allred should not have 
to pay for the first, fruitless appeal. She should not have to 
pay for TSl' s wrongful efforts to execute on her supersedeas 
bond. And, she should not have to pay a total of $380.00 for a 
scheduling conference in the court below. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of February, 
1993. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
iV^Ly^ By ;/kb-tfMk ^XllM^ 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Allred 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145 
Te lephone : (801) 532-3333 
1 6 1 X 1 0 1 5 7 
- 2 9 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing APPELLANT' S BRIEF to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, this 24th day of February, 1993, to the 
following: 
Arnold Richer 
Richer, Swan & Overholt 
311 South State, Suite 350/ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 ' 
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Exhibit A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
ALLRED, PENNY 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 900903454 CV 
DATE 10/25/90 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STG 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. RICHER, ARNOLD 
D. ATTY. DALTON, DONALD L 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAVING BEEN 
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501 AND THE COURT 
HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW BEING FULLY ADVISED IN THE PREMISES 
ORDERS PLAINTIFF GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR $12,720.27 AND 
ATTORNEY FEES OF $1,560 AND COSTS. 
CC: ARNOLD RICHER 
DONALD L DALTON 
JUDGEMENT 
NOV 2 1990 
Arnold Richer - 2751 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT 
TIME, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Nb^S* 
\\~^)~C\O^.\0LCU^ 
Civil No. 900903454 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, having come before 
this Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 (8) Judicial Counsel Rules of 
Judicial Administration, and the Court having reviewed the file 
herein and being fully advised in the premises and upon motion of 
Arnold Richer of RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C, attorneys for 
Plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded judgment as against the Defendant 
in the amount of $12,720.27, together with interest at the contract 
rate of 20% per annum from February 4, 1990 until paid in full. 
3. Plaintiff is further awarded judgment as against the 
Defendant in the sum of $89.25 representing costs and $1,560.00 
representing attorney's fees incurred herein. 
DATED this day of November, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed in the United States mail, first 
class, postage prepaid this ^l/'tfJ^ day of October, 1990 to th? 
following: 
DONALD L. DALTON, Esquire 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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Exhibit B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
ALLRED, PENNY 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 900903454 CV 
DATE 10/14/92 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAVING BEEN 
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501. COMES NOW THE 
COURT AND ORDERS MOTION GRANTED. 
CC: ARNOLD RICHER 
DONALD L. DALTON 
Arnold Richer - 2751 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN 6 OVERHOLT, P.C. 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 7 1992 
DEPUTY Tf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT 
TIME, 
Defendant. 
ORDER and JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900903454 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, having come before 
this Court pursuant to Rule 4-501(8) Judicial Counsel Rules of 
Judicial Administration, and the Court having reviewed the file and 
pleadings herein and being fully advised in the premises, and 
having submitted its Minute Entry of October 14, 1992, and the 
Court having made its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and upon motion of Arnold Richer of Richer, Swan & Overholt, 
P.C, attorneys for Plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Civil No. 900903454 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted. 
2. Defendant's First Cause of Action of her Counterclaim, 
seeking recovery for sums expended for tenant improvements, is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
3. Defendant's Second Cause of Action of her Counterclaim, 
seeking compensation for Plaintiff's breach of an alleged non-
competition agreement, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Defendant's Third Cause of Action, seeking unspecified 
compensation for business interruption, is hereby dismissed. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment as against Defendant in the 
amount of $8,760.00, representing additional attorney's fees 
incurred. 
DATED this 2 7 day of /L <v/ 
BY THE COURT: f ' 
\ 
Jaiqe^ 
Disti 
7s. 
^i£t 
Sawaya 
Court 
, 1992 . 
^ 
Judge 
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Judge Sawaya 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the f0 day of October, 1992, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Donald L. Dalton, Esquire 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 7 1992 
Arnold Richer - 2751 WLI L*I\C ujUNrv 
Mark E. Medcal f - 5404
 R y ^ &A.y/v,A 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. DEWrYi 
ar . edcal   V ^ ftAi/vx^.,. 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT 
TIME, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 900903454 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, having come before 
this Court pursuant to Rule 4-501(8) Judicial Counsel Rules of 
Judicial Administration, and the Court having reviewed the file and 
pleadings herein and being fully advised in the premises and having 
submitted its Minute Entry of October 14, 1992, the Court does now 
make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is an Indiana limited partnership duly 
authorized to do business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and at 
0 
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Judge Sawaya 
all times material herein did business in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and elsewhere. 
2. Defendant is an individual and resident of Salt lake 
County, State of Utah, who entered into an agreement to be 
performed in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. On or about March 4, 1987 Plaintiff, as landlord, and 
Defendant, doing business under the name of It's About Time, as 
tenant, entered into a Lease Agreement, a copy of which is attached 
to the Complaint as Exhibit "A". 
4. On or about March 11, 1988 Plaintiff and Defendant 
entered into and executed an Agreement Setting Lease Term, which 
further set forth the duties and obligations of the respective 
parties relating to the Lease Agreement. A copy of the Agreement 
Setting Lease Term is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "BM. 
5. The Lease Agreement included a document entitled 
"Schedule "B" setting forth the obligations of Plaintiff and 
Defendant with regard to work to be performed on or about the 
premises. A copy of Schedule "B" is attached to Plaintifffs 
Memorandum of Undisputed Facts, Point and Authorities in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibit "B". 
6. The Lease Agreement includes an integration clause. 
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7. The Lease Agreement includes provisions governing the 
relative rights and duties of the parties thereto with regard to 
improvements to the leased premises. Included among the 
obligations of the Defendant, as tenant, are the obligations set 
forth in Section 2.2(b) to perform all improvements to the premises 
as set forth in Schedule "B". 
8. Defendant is obligated, pursuant to the terms of the 
Lease Agreement, to prepare at its own expense all plans and 
specifications needed for tenant's work. 
9. Pursuant to the terms of the Lease Agreement, the 
Defendant is obligated to maintain the premises at Defendant's cost 
in good condition making all repairs required thereto. 
10. The Defendant is similarly obligated to repair damage to 
the leased premises. 
11. The Defendant is also obligated, pursuant to the terms of 
the Lease Agreement, to make any and all alterations, renovations 
and improvements to the leased premises at its own expense. 
12. Use to which the Defendant is permitted to put the leased 
premises is set forth in the Lease Agreement and is limited to the 
sale of clocks, watches, gifts, etc. 
3 
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13. The Defendant was, pursuant to the terms of the Lease 
Agreement, limited to use of the leased premises for the "permitted 
use" only, unless prior written consent of Plaintiff was obtained. 
14. The Defendant agreed to refrain from competing with 
Plaintiff by opening any other business similar to Defendant's 
business within five (5) miles of the Trolley Square Mall. 
15. The Lease Agreement does not provide the Defendant should 
have any exclusive right to market any particular line of goods or 
merchandise within the shopping center. 
16. The Plaintiff had not only the right but the obligation 
to maintain and remodel the Trolley Square Mall and common areas 
therein. 
17. Plaintiff's right and obligation to maintain common areas 
is detailed at pages 26 and 27, Section 8.1(d) of the Lease 
Agreement which sets forth Plaintiff's right to temporarily close 
any and all portions of the common areas to redefine and improve 
the common areas. 
18. Plaintiff's rights and obligations with regard to 
maintenance of the Trolley Square Mall are further set forth at 
page 30, Section 10.1 of the Lease Agreement, wherein Plaintiff 
4 
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received the right and duty to maintain the structural integrity of 
the building. 
19. The Court finds that the Lease Agreement constitutes an 
integrated instrument incorporating all the rights and liabilities 
of the parties. 
20. The Court finds that parol evidence is not admissible to 
vary or add to the terms of the Lease Agreement. 
21. The Court finds that Plaintiff has incurred additional 
attorney's fees in the sum of $8,760.00 since September 17, 1990 
when its first Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees was filed. 
22. The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay 
and expressly directs that Judgment be entered forthwith. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
adopts its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted. 
2. Defendant's First Cause of Action of her Counterclaim 
seeking recovery for sums expended for tenant improvements is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
5 
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3. Defendant's Second Cause of Action of her Counterclaim, 
seeking compensation for Plaintiff's breach of an alleged non-
competition agreement, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Defendant's Third Cause of Action of her Counterclaim, 
seeking unspecified compensation for business interruption, is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment as against Defendant in the 
amount of $8,760.00, representing additional attorney's fees 
incurred. 
DATED this ^ / day of Mf S^^ , 1992. 
BY THE 
James S. Sawaya 
District Court Judge 
Civil No. 900903454 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / 7 day of October, 1992, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Donald L. Dalton, Esquire 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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Arnold Richer - 2751 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
* t 
..". -- - - . 
JAN 2 4 1991 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER 
V. 
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT 
TIME, Civil No. 900903454 CV 
Judge Sawaya Defendant. 
. ooOoo 
Defendant's Motion to Stay Execution and Plaintiff's Motion 
for Revision of Judgment, having come before this Court pursuant 
to Rule 4-501 (8) Judicial Counsel Rules of Judicial 
Administration, and the Court having reviewed the file herein and 
being fully advised in the premises, and having submitted its 
Minute Entry of January 16, 1991, and upon motion of Arnold Richer 
of Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C, Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Stay Execution is hereby denied. 
<; 
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Revision of Judgment is hereby 
granted, and the Judgment entered herein on November 2, 1990, is 
hereby certified as a final Judgment pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, j DATED this day of January, 1991. 
BY TH 
Approved as to >fonn: 
MUSW 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER was mailed in the United States Mail, first class, postage 
prepaid to the following this o?/Sj- day of January, 1991: 
Donald L. Dalton, Esquire 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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Arnold Richer - 2751 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 8ALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT 
TIME, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED ORDER 
Civil No. 900903454 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
ooOoo 
Defendant's Motion to Stay Execution and Plaintiff's Motion 
for Revision of Judgment, having come before this Court pursuant to 
Rule 4-501 (8) Judicial Counsel Rules of Judicial Administration, 
and the Court having reviewed the file herein and being fully 
advised in the premises, and having submitted its Minute Entry of 
January 16, 1991, and upon motion of Arnold Richer of RICHER, SWAN 
& OVERHOLT, P.C, Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant1s Motion to Stay Execution is hereby denied. 
2. Based upon the specific finding of this Court that the 
ruling herein wholly disposes of the claim of the Plaintiff and 
that there is no just reason to delay any further proceeding herein 
or an appeal herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Revision of Judgment is 
hereby granted, and the Judgment entered herein on November 2, 1990 
is hereby certified as a final Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of /V, 
Court Judge 
APPROVED AS T 
Donald L. Dalxon 
Attorney For Defendant 
ORM: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
AMENDED ORDER was mailed in the United States Mail, first class, 
postage prepaid this / 7 day of April, 1991 to the following: 
Donald L. Dalton, Esquire 
VAN COTT, BA6LEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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Exhibit D 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
ALLRED, PENNY 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 900903454 CV 
DATE 08/21/90 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STG 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. RICHER, ARNOLD 
D. ATTY. DALTON, DONALD L 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL HAVING 
BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501 AND THE 
COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW BEING FULLY ADVISED IN THE 
PREMISES ORDERS SAID MOTION BE AND THE SAME IS HEREBY GRANTED. 
CC: ARNOLD RICHER 
DONALD L. DALTON 
AUG 3 0 1990 
Arnold Richer - 2751 J x* 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT 
TIME, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 900903454 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Request for Jury Trial, having 
come before this Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Judicial 
Counsel Rules of Judicial Administration, and the court having 
reviewed the file herein and being fully advised in the premises, 
and upon motion of Arnold Richer of RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C, 
attorneys for Plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1* Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Request for Jury Trial is 
hereby granted. 
2. Defendant's Jury Trial Request is hereby stricken. 
DATED this day of August, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
JAME8\S. SAWAYA 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER was mailed in the United States Mail, first class, postage 
prepaid to Donald L. Dalton, Esquire, Attorneys for Defendant, VAN 
COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, 50 South Main Street, Suite 
1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, this ^^(tfday of August, 1990. 
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